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Abstract 
This paper explores the effect of terms of trade volatility on macroeconomic 
volatility using a panel of 71 countries from 1971–2005. It finds that terms of trade 
volatility has a statistically significant and positive impact on the volatility of 
output growth and inflation, although the magnitudes of these effects depend on 
the policy framework and the structure of markets. Specifically, adopting a more 
flexible exchange rate tends to ameliorate the effect of terms of trade shocks on 
macroeconomic volatility. The paper also finds some evidence that a monetary 
policy regime that focuses on low inflation helps to moderate the volatility of 
output and inflation in the face of a volatile terms of trade. The same is true of 
financial market development in the case of output volatility. Using data on the 
expenditure components of GDP, the channels through which terms of trade 
shocks affect output are examined. The results suggest that terms of trade volatility 
has its largest effect on the volatility of consumption, exports and imports. There is 
evidence to suggest that greater financial market development helps to mitigate the 
effect of terms of trade volatility on consumption volatility, while monetary policy 
that focuses on low inflation is associated with lower volatility of imports. 
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MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND  
TERMS OF TRADE SHOCKS 
Dan Andrews and Daniel Rees 
1.  Introduction 
The Australian economy has historically been subject to large swings in its terms 
of trade (Table 1), with these swings having a significant effect on both output and 
inflation. Over time, however, the impact of these swings on the economy appears 
to have lessened somewhat (see Figure 1 and the discussion in Gruen 2006), 
apparently reflecting changes to the overall policy framework and the structure of 
markets. By drawing on cross-country data, this paper formally examines the idea 
that the nature of the policy framework and the flexibility of markets have a 
significant effect on how economies respond to changes in their terms of trade.  
Table 1: Terms of Trade Volatility 
Standard deviation of terms of trade growth 
 Australia  Industrialised  economies  Developing  economies 
1971–1980 8.5  5.6  16.2 
1981–1990 6.3  5.0  13.6 
1991–2000   4.8  3.5  9.9 
2001–2009   7.9  3.1  6.7
(a) 
Note:  (a) Data for developing economies only for period 2001–2005 
Sources:   see Appendix A. Data for 2009 are forecasts, sourced from the OECD Economic Outlook No 85. 
 
We adopt an atheoretic approach based on cross-country panel data models, where 
the volatility of output and inflation (the dependent variables) are initially 
regressed on the volatility of terms of trade shocks – to account for the size of the 
shock – and a host of control variables. We then interact the terms of trade with a 
number of the control variables intended to represent the policy frameworks and 
the structure of financial and labour markets that are likely to be relevant for the 
propagation of terms of trade shocks. 
   2





















-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16
%
Nominal exchange rate(b)




Quarters from terms of trade peak
%
 
Notes:  (a) Peak = 100 
  (b) Nominal exchange rate is the trade-weighted index, peak in terms of trade = 100 
 (c)  Year-ended 
Sources:   ABS; RBA 
In our sample of 71 countries for the period 1971 to 2005, we find that shocks to 
the terms of trade are an important source of output and inflation volatility.1 While 
monetary policy regimes that focus on low inflation reduce macroeconomic 
volatility in general (particularly with respect to output),2 floating exchange rates 
appear to provide the key macroeconomic stabilisation tool for economies that are 
subject to sizeable terms of trade shocks. Our results provide some evidence to 
suggest that in the presence of terms of trade volatility other structural features of 
                                           
1  Our sample concludes in 2005 due to data constraints. Accordingly, our analysis does not 
cover the most recent period of heightened volatility associated with the sharp rise in 
commodity prices up to 2008 and the Global Financial Crisis. 
2  See Section 3 for a detailed discussion on how monetary policy is measured. While we find 
that monetary policy frameworks that focus on low inflation reduce output volatility in 
general, the effect on inflation volatility is more sensitive to the econometric specification 
chosen. However, the role that monetary policy plays in reducing inflation volatility could 
occur through other channels – for example, by keeping the average rate of inflation low and 
thereby providing an anchor for inflation expectations (see Section 4).   3
an economy affect output volatility; there is weaker evidence for an effect of these 
structural features on inflation volatility. To obtain a better understanding of the 
effect on output, we adopt a disaggregated approach, estimating how terms of trade 
shocks and structural features affect the volatility of the various expenditure 
components of GDP. These results suggest that terms of trade volatility has its 
largest effect on the volatility of consumption, exports and imports. We also find 
that greater financial market development reduces the impact of terms of trade 
shocks on macroeconomic volatility, but that this effect occurs primarily through 
household consumption. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A brief review of the literature, and a 
discussion of how this paper extends existing research, is provided in Section 2. 
The data and methodological issues are discussed in Section 3. Estimates of the 
effect of the volatility of terms of trade shocks on output and inflation volatility, 
and the extent to which institutional arrangements condition these relationships are 
presented in Section 4. The analysis is extended in Section 5 to consider the effect 
of terms of trade volatility on the expenditure components of output growth. The 
sensitivity of the results to alternative econometric specifications is considered in 
Section 6, while conclusions are drawn in Section 7.  
2.  Literature 
Terms of trade shocks have been found to be an important source of 
macroeconomic volatility. Using a small open economy real business cycle model, 
Mendoza  (1995) estimates that roughly one-half of the variation in aggregate 
output in a sample of the G7 and 23 developing economies can be attributed to 
terms of trade shocks. Kose (2002) applies a similar framework and finds that 
terms of trade shocks can explain almost all of the variance in output in small open 
developing economies. Changes in the terms of trade affect output to the extent 
that they alter the volume of imports that can be purchased for a given volume of 
exports and hence the economy’s real domestic income.3 The resulting fluctuations 
in domestic spending may well be reflected in inflation, both directly through the 
                                           
3  From the perspective of a firm in the export sector, a rise in export prices relative to import 
prices raises real producer returns (relative to consumer prices) for a given level of inputs, 
which could stimulate business investment and output (Grimes 2006).   4
shock’s impact on domestic prices and wages, and indirectly through its effect on 
output. 
While terms of trade shocks have the potential to affect macroeconomic stability, 
the transmission of such shocks to the broader economy varies across countries. 
For instance, terms of trade shocks are likely to have a greater effect on 
macroeconomic volatility in countries more open to international trade, as terms of 
trade shocks will have their most direct effects on the tradable sector of an 
economy (Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni 2006). The effect of shocks can also vary 
across countries due to differences in national economic institutions (Blanchard 
and Wolfers 2000), including the nature of an economy’s exchange rate and 
monetary policy regime, the level of financial sector development and labour 
market flexibility.  
Economies with more flexible exchange rates are likely to be better able to 
accommodate terms of trade shocks than those with fixed exchange rates. 
Broda  (2004) and Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005), for example, using cross-
country panel data find that the cumulative reduction in real GDP following a 
decline in the terms of trade is much larger in economies with fixed exchange rates 
than economies with floating exchange rates. This is consistent with the idea that, 
given an adverse terms of trade shock, a country with a flexible exchange rate will 
adjust through a currency depreciation, which tends to offset the shock’s negative 
effects on output via a boost in external competitiveness. Moreover, if nominal 
wages are sticky, the depreciation of the exchange rate can reduce real wages at a 
time when labour demand is likely to be weak (Meade 1951). By contrast, the 
equilibrium real exchange rate under a fixed exchange rate regime has to adjust 
through changes in domestic nominal prices and wages. In the presence of nominal 
rigidities, this process can imply particularly large output costs. Flexible exchange 
rates also have the potential to ameliorate the impact of terms of trade shocks on 
inflation. For the case of Australia, Gruen and Dwyer  (1995) concluded that a 
sufficiently large appreciation of the real exchange rate can offset the inflationary 
impact of a positive terms of trade shock.  
Our paper builds on the existing literature in a number of ways. Specifically, we 
focus on the impact of unanticipated volatility in the terms of trade – that is, terms 
of trade shocks – on macroeconomic volatility (see Section 3). In contrast,   5
Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) focus on the rate of change in the terms of trade 
which does not allow for the potentially different macroeconomic effects of 
anticipated and unanticipated movements. While Broda (2004) also identifies 
unanticipated changes in the terms of trade by employing a VAR framework, our 
paper also controls for other institutional characteristics that are likely to affect the 
propagation of terms of trade shocks, including the nature of a country’s monetary 
policy regime. The latter is potentially important to the extent that while flexible 
exchange rate regimes enable countries to pursue an independent monetary policy, 
discretionary monetary policy can also serve as a source of shocks, as well as a 
stabilising tool (Clark and van Wincoop 2001). 
While Kent, Smith and Holloway (2005) also find a role for the conduct of 
monetary policy in explaining the trend decline in OECD output volatility, their 
analysis does not distinguish between the role of the monetary policy framework in 
the propagation of shocks and the size of these shocks. In this paper, we allow for 
the possibility that the monetary policy framework affects the propagation of terms 
of trade shocks. For example, if a rising terms of trade warrants tighter monetary 
policy in order to stabilise inflation, countries with a monetary policy regime that 
focuses on low inflation are more likely to deliver this policy adjustment. 
Alternatively, if the shock is perceived to be short-lived, there is some scope for 
monetary policy to look through the stimulus if inflation expectations are well-
anchored (Stevens 2008),4 otherwise the shock has the potential to fuel wage and 
price inflation.  
The nature of the financial system will also matter if more developed financial 
markets allow agents to better smooth their expenditure decisions and deal with 
fluctuations in the exchange rate and other prices in the face of terms of trade 
shocks. However, the overall effect of financial market development on 
macroeconomic volatility is ambiguous to the extent that more developed financial 
markets can amplify shocks, such as to banks’ balance sheets, implying greater 
output volatility (Beck et al 2006). While Beck et al find only weak evidence that 
financial development dampens the effects of terms of trade volatility on output 
volatility, we test this hypothesis more directly by investigating the impact of terms 
of trade shocks on the volatility of expenditure components of GDP, including 
                                           
4 The anchoring of inflation expectations might occur through a well-understood inflation 
target.   6
consumption and investment. To the best of our knowledge, this disaggregated 
approach to analyse how economic institutions affect the propagation of terms of 
trade shocks distinguishes our paper from most others in the literature. 
Kent  et al (2005) also find a role for labour and product market reform in 
explaining the decline in OECD output volatility over recent decades (at least up 
until 2003). Reforms to factor markets can reduce output volatility by encouraging 
productive resources to shift more readily in response to differential shocks across 
firms and sectors. Accordingly, an economy’s adjustment to terms of trade shocks 
might also depend on the relative flexibility of its labour market. If real wages are 
inflexible, the ability of floating exchange rates to temper the effect of terms of 
trade shocks on macroeconomic volatility becomes limited (Meade 1951; Edwards 
and Levy Yeyati 2005). Real wage inflexibility can arise directly from wage 
indexation, or be a product of high levels of unionisation and strict employment 
protection legislation (Clar, Dreger and Ramos 2007).  
In a paper drafted contemporaneously with this one, Rumler and Scharler (2009) 
find that in a panel of 20 OECD countries, the effect of fluctuations in the terms of 
trade on output volatility is amplified in economies where trade union density is 
high. However, they also find that more co-ordinated labour markets (that is, where 
the level of communication between labour unions representing different groups is 
high) can have a stabilising effect.5 Given that the volatility in Australia’s terms of 
trade often lies between that of a typical industrialised and typical developing 
economy (Table 1), it makes sense for us to extend this analysis to also include 
non-OECD economies.  
3.  Data and Methodology 
We use a sample of 71 countries/economies with data for the period 1971 to 2005. 
As is common in the literature, we transform our data into five-year averages, with 
                                           
5  It is possible that unions internalise the macroeconomic consequences of their actions in 
economies with a high degree of labour market co-ordination (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). If 
unions care about the employment of existing members as well as the real wage, they will 
have an incentive to moderate wage demands in response to adverse macroeconomic shocks 
(Cukierman and Lippi 1999).   7
the first period including the years 1971 to 1975 and the final period including the 
years 2001 to 2005. Detailed data descriptions and sources are provided in 
Appendix A and a list of countries is provided in Appendix B. 
In order to examine the effect of terms of trade shocks, it is first necessary to 
define these shocks. While a common approach in the literature is to use the 
standard deviation of terms of trade growth to measure terms of trade volatility 
(Beck et al 2006), some terms of trade movements are likely to be predictable. If 
so, changes in the terms of trade will be imperfect proxies for terms of trade 
shocks. In particular, to the extent that firms and households act in a forward-
looking manner, failing to take account of predictable terms of trade movements 
could bias our estimates of the effects of terms of trade volatility towards zero. 
To control for anticipated terms of trade movements, we follow Kent and 
Cashin (2003), and estimate equations of the form: 
  ,, is i i is is TOT c TOT   1 ,     (1) 
where  s i TOT ,   is the growth rate of the terms of trade in country i at time s and ci 
is a constant term for country i.6 It is important to emphasise that we allow the 
slope coefficient in Equation (1),  i  , to vary across countries. This allows the 
persistence of terms of trade movements to differ across economies. The residual 
from Equation (1),  s i,  , represents the terms of trade shock to country i at time s. 
Our measure of the volatility of terms of trade shocks is the log of the standard 
deviation of  s i,   over each five-year block (henceforth ), where t identifies the 
date of the five-year block.  
TOT
it 
The dependent variables in our regressions are the volatilities of output growth, 
CPI inflation and the expenditure components of output – household consumption, 
gross fixed capital formation, public consumption expenditure, exports and 
imports. All output variables are measured in real per capita terms. As was the 
case for the terms of trade, we first extract the unexpected component of each 
variable by regressing its annual change on a constant and a single lag, and then 
                                           
6  As is standard, our measure of the terms of trade is the ratio of a price index of an economy’s 
exports of goods and services to a price index of its imports of goods and services.    8
calculate volatility as the log of the standard deviation of the residuals from this 
equation within each five-year block, t. 
We estimate fixed-effects panel regressions to examine the effect of the volatility 
of terms of trade shocks on the volatility of output and inflation. Each regression 
takes the form: 
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where:   is the log of the standard deviation of the dependent variable of interest 
for country i,   is the log of the standard deviation of the terms of trade shock, 
 is a vector of structural variables and   is a vector of control variables. To 
capture the likely lagged effect of structural change and to ensure that the structural 
indicators are exogenous, we follow Kent et al (2005) and include the structural 
variables in our regressions with a lag. That is, we match the volatility of annual 
GDP over a given five-year block at time t, with the value of the structural 
indicator that applies in the year just prior to this (for example, output volatility 
over the five years ending 1975 is matched with the level of financial market 
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t  ) to control for common shocks.   
This empirical framework allows us to estimate how different structural 
characteristics affect the propagation of terms of trade shocks ( ), as well 
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1  it V   captures how the various structural characteristics 
condition the responsiveness of the economy to all other shocks, as well as the size 
of these shocks.  
We interact the terms of trade with several variables intended to represent policy 
frameworks and other structural features of the economy relevant to the 
propagation of terms of trade shocks. Our measure of exchange rate flexibility is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if an economy has a floating or managed 
floating exchange rate according to the de facto exchange rate classification system   9
of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and zero otherwise.7 We prefer this measure of 
exchange rate flexibility to alternative de jure classification schemes (as used in 
Ghosh et al 1997) as it is actual exchange rate flexibility, rather than the formal 
exchange rate regime, that is likely to influence an economy’s adjustment to terms 
of trade shocks.8 
To account for the role of monetary policy as a determinant of macroeconomic 
volatility, we construct a dummy variable intended to capture the extent to which 
the monetary policy framework focuses on low inflation, hereafter referred to 
simply as ‘strict’ monetary policy. Similar to Kent et al (2005), we assume that 
Germany, Japan and Switzerland had strict monetary regimes throughout the 
sample period. Monetary policy in the United States is deemed to have had strict 
monetary policy from 1981 – corresponding to the first complete five-year block of 
the Volcker chairmanship – while monetary policy in other European countries is 
assumed to have become strict when they joined the euro area. Finally, an 
economy’s monetary policy is assumed to have become strict in the year in which 
it adopted a formal inflation target (IMF 2006). 
It is worth noting that this variable could well underestimate the number of ‘strict’ 
monetary policy observations in our sample. In particular, it omits economies that 
import effective monetary policy by pegging their nominal exchange rate to the 
currency of an economy whose central bank is strict on inflation. We excluded this 
type of monetary policy regime for two reasons. First, it is difficult to differentiate 
between economies that adopt an inflexible nominal exchange rate regime to 
stabilise inflation from those that do so for other reasons, including strategic trade 
policy. Second, the benefits of a pegged exchange rate for macroeconomic stability 
are better captured by our exchange rate dummy variable. Excluding countries 
which adopt a pegged exchange rate in order to help stabilise inflation (and output) 
will tend to bias the estimated coefficients on our strict monetary policy variable, 
and its interaction terms, towards zero.  
                                           
7 The Reinhart and Rogoff classification system orders exchange rate regimes into four 
categories from the most rigid to the most flexible: fixed, pegged, managed float and float. 
8 We also considered the alternative Levy  Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) de facto 
classification system. However, we preferred the Reinhart and Rogoff classification because it 
is available for a much larger number of countries, and over a longer sample.   10
We measure financial development in terms of the level of domestic credit 
provided to the private sector (as a share of GDP). This is a widely used measure 
of financial development (Levine, Loayza and Beck 2000; Beck et al 2006), which 
indicates the extent to which a country’s financial system channels funds from 
savers to private sector investors. We interpret higher levels of private credit as an 
indication of a more developed financial system. 
We consider two measures of labour market flexibility. The first is constructed 
using the index of labour market regulations component of the Economic Freedom 
of the World report, published by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson 
2008).9 This index takes a value between one and ten, with a higher number 
indicating a less regulated labour market. The index value depends on a number of 
factors, including: the value of a country’s mandated minimum wage relative to 
average value added per worker; regulations concerning the hiring and firing of 
workers; and the degree of wage decentralisation. For estimation purposes, we use 
this index to construct three dummy variables: low labour market flexibility, 
medium labour market flexibility and high labour market flexibility, which 
correspond to the bottom, middle and top thirds of the distribution respectively. 
We adopt this approach for both ease of interpretation and to allow for the possible 
hump-shaped relationship between labour market flexibility and macroeconomic 
outcomes (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). 
While this measure of labour market flexibility is available for a large number of 
countries and the relative values of the index between countries and over time 
appear to correspond broadly with known periods of labour market deregulation, it 
has limitations. For instance, it is only able to capture a limited set of factors that 
determine how the labour market operates and tends to rely heavily on subjective 
interpretations of the legal framework. With this in mind, we also follow Andrews 
and Kohler (2005) and include union density to proxy the degree of labour market 
flexibility, although this reduces the number of countries in our sample by roughly 
one-fifth to 56 countries. 
                                           
9 Kent  et al (2005) also used the number of days lost in labour disputes as a proxy for the extent 
of labour market regulation. While this measure can capture labour market outcomes more 
directly, and captures a broader range of factors that determine how the labour market 
operates than the data on the labour market regulations we use, it is not widely available for 
the larger number of countries in our sample.    11
For this empirical framework to reliably identify the macroeconomic effects of 
terms of trade shocks, we need to assume that terms of trade shocks are exogenous 
with respect to output volatility. This is potentially problematic for large 
economies or countries that have a sizeable market share in a particular good 
(Broda 2004; Edwards and Levy Yeyati 2005).10 Given the lack of suitable 
instruments for the terms of trade, the standard approach in the literature has been 
to exclude those economies from the analysis where the exogeneity assumption is 
likely to be problematic. Using a sample of countries similar to ours, Edwards and 
Levy Yeyati (2005) found their results to be robust to such an approach, leading 
them to conclude that their results are unlikely to be driven by terms of trade 
endogeneity. In Section 5 we show that our results are also broadly robust to the 
exclusion of specific groups of economies where the exogeneity assumption is 
likely to be more of a concern.  
We also include a number of control variables in our regressions. Consistent with 
the related literature, all regressions contain a measure of openness to international 
trade (proxied by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP). The inflation volatility 
regressions also include the log of the average annual rate of inflation in the five 
years prior to the start of each window as well as a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if an economy experiences a currency crisis during a five-year 
window.11 All regressions include time-fixed effects to control for the general 
decline in macroeconomic volatility through our sample. Throughout the paper, we 
calculate robust standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity of unknown form.  
Table 2 shows the key summary statistics for our variables. As to be expected, the 
shocks to household consumption are considerably less volatile than the shocks to 
other expenditure components. While the estimated shocks contained in Table 2 
also imply that consumption is more volatile than output, this result is driven by 
                                           
10  Even for small economies, such as Australia, long-run terms of trade movements could be 
endogenous to the extent that the composition of imports and exports changes over time 
(Gillitzer and Kearns 2005). However, over any given five-year window, exogeneity is still 
likely to be a reasonable assumption. 
11  The currency crisis dummy takes a value of one if a country experienced a free-falling 
exchange rate regime, as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), at any time during a five-
year window. These episodes tend to be associated with the abandonment of fixed exchange 
rate regimes.    12
the numerous commodity producers in our sample.12 Table C1 shows correlations 
across these different variables, while further information on the construction of 
our variables is presented in Appendix A. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Min Max 
Dependent variables
(a)      
SD real GDP shocks  2.68  2.01  0.36  12.19 
SD consumption shocks  3.70  3.40  0.20  22.72 
SD investment shocks  9.46  7.28  1.23  46.97 










SD export shocks  7.50  5.33  0.68  45.52 
SD import shocks  9.56  6.07  1.03  35.91 
SD inflation shocks  31.42  300  0.19  5 087 
Independent variables       
SD terms of trade shocks
(a) 8.25  7.45  0.55  42.48 
Private credit (share of GDP)
(b) 49  38  2  222 
Floating exchange rate dummy
(c) 0.30  0.46  0.00  1.00 
Strict monetary policy dummy
(d) 0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00 











Notes:   All descriptive statistics are based on a sample of 71 countries and 411 observations. 
  (a) Standard deviation (SD) of the annual shocks (that is, the residual from Equation (1), estimated over a 
five-year window. Note that the regression analysis later in the paper is based on the natural log of the
standard deviation of these shocks over the same five-year window. 
  (b) Total private credit as a per cent of nominal GDP; annual average observed at five-year intervals. 
  (c) Dummy variable that takes a value of one if an economy has a floating or managed floating exchange
rate according to the de facto exchange rate classification system of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and zero
otherwise. 
  (d) Dummy variable that takes a value of one if an economy’s monetary authorities are deemed to have
been strict on inflation, and zero otherwise. See Section 3 for more detail. 
  (e) The value of total trade as a per cent to nominal GDP; annual average observed at five-year intervals. 
                                           
12 In the G7 economies, for example, the volatility of the shocks to consumption are lower than 
the volatility of the shocks to output.   13
4.  The Impact of Terms of Trade Volatility on Macroeconomic 
Volatility 
To understand the effect of terms of trade volatility on macroeconomic volatility, 
we first estimate Equation (2) without the interactive terms. The results in Table 3 
suggest that terms of trade volatility has a statistically significant positive effect on 
the volatility of output growth and inflation. The point estimates imply that if the 
volatility of annual terms of trade growth was greater by one standard deviation, 
the volatility of shocks to annual GDP growth would be 1.1 percentage points 
greater and the volatility of annual inflation shocks would be 1.2 percentage points 
greater.13  
The estimated effects of the control variables on output volatility generally accord 
with our prior expectations. In particular, adopting a strict monetary policy regime 
reduces the volatility of shocks to annual output growth in the next five years by 
around 0.24 percentage points. This finding is consistent with Kent et al (2005), 
and demonstrates the stabilising role that credible monetary policy plays in 
general.  
As in Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000), the point estimates in our regressions 
suggest that (other things equal) floating exchange rates are associated with higher 
output volatility, although this effect is not statistically significant. More trade 
openness is associated with less output volatility while more developed financial 
institutions are positively associated with output volatility, although neither effect 
is statistically significant. The insignificance of the credit term is not unexpected 
given that the theoretical relationship between financial market development and 
output volatility is ambiguous, and is contingent on the nature of the shocks   
(Beck et al 2006). 
                                           
13  A one standard deviation increase in the volatility of annual terms of trade shocks is 
equivalent to 0.90 log points (based on the result shown in Table 2), while the coefficient on 
the terms of trade term is 0.13 in the output volatility regression and 0.21 in the inflation 
volatility regression (Table 3). Given that these regressions are estimated in logarithmic form, 
a one standard deviation increase in terms of trade volatility increases output volatility and 
inflation volatility by e
0.9x0.13=1.1  percentage points and e
0.9x0.21=1.2 percentage  points, 
respectively.   14
Table 3: Panel Regression Results 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
 Regression 
  Dependent variable 
  Output volatility  Inflation volatility 
    [3.1]    [3.2]    [3.3]      [3.4]    [3.5] 
Terms of trade variables          
 Terms of trade t   0.13**    0.21**  0.19*** 
Control variables          
Openness t-1 –0.05  0.00  –0.29  –0.21  –0.25 
Credit t-1 0.13  0.12  –0.07  –0.07   
Floating exchange rate t-1 0.12*  0.13*  –0.15  –0.14  –0.16 
Strict monetary policy t-1 –0.25*  –0.27**  –0.08  –0.11  –0.30 
Inflation t-1     0.24**  0.24*   
Currency crisis t     1.51*** 1.47***  1.56*** 
Number of countries/observations 71/411  71/411 71/402  71/402  71/402 
R
2 within 0.21  0.23  0.50  0.51  0.47 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, 
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects.  
 
In the inflation volatility equations, we find that economies with higher rates of 
inflation also tend to experience more inflation volatility, a standard result in the 
literature. The coefficient on the currency crisis dummy is also positive and 
significant, illustrating the disruptive effect of large exchange rate depreciations 
(often associated with the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate regime) on 
domestic prices. The other control variables have negative coefficients, but these 
are not statistically significant. In the case of strict monetary policy, this result is 
surprising in light of existing evidence that inflation targeting reduces the volatility 
of inflation (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel 2009, for example). While this result 
could partly reflect the relative crudeness of our measure of strict monetary policy, 
the problem of multi-collinearity could also be a factor, given the relatively strong 
correlation between strict monetary policy and the credit to GDP variable (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.60; see Table C1). Moreover, to the extent that strict 
monetary policy stabilises inflation volatility by reducing the average rate of 
inflation, the lagged CPI inflation term – which is highly significant in   
Regression [3.4] – could well be a proxy for the impact of strict monetary policy. 
Indeed, when we exclude the credit and lagged inflation terms (Regression [3.5]),   15
the size of the strict monetary policy coefficient almost triples and becomes 
marginally significant (with a p-value of 0.11), with only a minor reduction in 
explanatory power overall (the R
2 within falls from 0.51 to 0.47).14 
Having determined that variation in terms of trade shocks matters for output and 
inflation volatility, we now ask how policies affect stability in the face of such 
terms of trade volatility. To do this, we interact our measure of terms of trade 
volatility with the structural indicators described in Section 3.  
Table 4 shows how our various structural variables affect the relationship between 
terms of trade volatility and output volatility. The main result is that adopting a 
floating exchange rate regime helps to stabilise an economy subject to a more 
volatile terms of trade (Regression [4.2]). The estimates imply that given a one 
standard deviation increase in the volatility of terms of trade shocks, other things 
equal, annual output volatility will be around 0.15  percentage points lower in 
economies with floating exchange rates than in economies with fixed exchange 
rate regimes.15 Indeed, given that the non-interacted floating exchange rate 
coefficient is positive and significant in this regression, it appears that offsetting 
terms of trade shocks are the main way in which a floating exchange rate helps to 
stabilise output volatility.  
The coefficients on both the strict monetary policy and financial market 
development interaction terms are also negative, although insignificant. The strict 
monetary policy interaction term, however, is jointly significant and negative when 
considered with the non-interaction strict monetary policy term. The credit result is 
broadly consistent with Beck et al (2006), who find only weak evidence for the 
idea that greater financial development dampens the impact of terms of trade 
                                           
14  Note that the strict monetary policy coefficient becomes significant at the 5 per cent level 
when we include interaction terms (see Regression [6.5]). 
15  In Regression [4.2], the coefficient on σTerms of trade t is 0.17 while the coefficient on 
σTerms of trade t*Floating exchange rate t-1 is –0.15. Accordingly, a one standard deviation 
increase in terms of trade volatility raises output volatility by e
0.9x0.17=1.17 percentage points 
in a fixed exchange rate regime, and by e
(0.9*0.17)+(0.9*–0.15)=1.02 percentage points in a floating 
exchange rate regime. Therefore, given a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of 
the terms of trade, annual output volatility is 0.15  percentage points lower in  a  floating 
exchange rate regime, compared with a fixed regime. In conducting this thought experiment, 
we abstract from the non-interacted floating exchange rate coefficient in Regression [4.2] to 
the extent that it captures how floating exchange rate regimes condition the responsiveness of 
the economy to all other (non terms of trade-related) shocks.   16
volatility on output volatility. In all equations, the coefficient on the terms of trade 
volatility variable is larger than in the model with no interaction terms. The results 
for the regression with all of the interactive terms included together are broadly 
similar to the regressions with each interactive term by itself. However, a Wald test 
for the significance of all of the institutional terms (both interacted and   
non-interacted in Regression [4.4]) suggests that these variables jointly have a 
significant moderating influence on the effect of terms of trade volatility on output 
volatility. Overall, we interpret these results as providing evidence that terms of 
trade shocks can increase the volatility of output, but that institutional settings can 
help to diminish the impact of these shocks. 
Table 4: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
  Regression 
 [3.2]  [4.1]  [4.2]    [4.3]    [4.4] 
Terms of trade variables         
Terms of trade t  0.13** 0.39*  0.17***  0.15***  0.37 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1   –0.07     –0.05 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1    –0.15**    –0.14* 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1      –0.17  –0.06 
Control variables        
Openness t-1 0.00  0.02  –0.03  0.01  –0.01 
Credit t-1 0.12  0.26*  0.14  0.12  0.25 
Floating exchange rate t-1 0.13*  0.14**  0.41**  0.13*  0.39***
Strict monetary policy t-1 –0.27**  –0.33*** –0.31**  –0.17  –0.31* 
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0    0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0    0.24  0.02  0.02  0.00 
H0: institution interaction coefficients 
(jointly) = 0 
        
0.10 
Number of countries/observations 71/411  71/411  71/411  71/411  71/411 
R
2 within 0.23  0.23  0.24  0.23  0.24 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, 
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects. 
 
Table 5 considers the impact of labour market flexibility on output volatility. 
Overall, the results are fairly weak. In the specification that employs the Economic   17
Freedom of the World Index, the interaction terms suggest that high labour market 
flexibility tempers the impact of terms of trade shocks on output volatility, though 
this effect is not statistically significant. When we use union density to proxy 
labour market flexibility, the interaction term is also statistically insignificant, 
though the effect goes the other way (that is, higher union density is associated 
with lower output volatility in the presence of terms of trade shocks). The only 
statistically significant coefficient of interest is the (non-interacted) union density 
term, which implies that more regulated labour markets – as proxied by higher 
union density – tend to raise output volatility. It is important to note, however, that 
this effect jointly captures the extent to which labour market flexibility affects the 
responsiveness of the economy to all other shocks (unrelated to the terms of trade), 
as well as the size of these shocks. This result is broadly consistent with Kent et al 
(2005), although they use a different measure of labour market flexibility – the 
number of days lost to labour disputes. 
Table 5: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
  Regression 
 [5.1]  [5.2] 
Terms of trade variables    
 Terms of trade t  0.15* 0.42 
 Terms of trade t * Medium labour market flexibility t-1  –0.01  
 Terms of trade t * High labour market flexibility t-1  –0.09  
 Terms of trade t * Union density t-1   –0.11 
Control variables    
Openness t-1 –0.01  –0.34 
Credit t-1 0.00  0.31** 
Floating exchange rate t-1 0.15**  0.16* 
Strict monetary policy t-1 –0.30**  –0.34** 
Medium labour market flexibility t-1 0.02   
High labour market flexibility t-1 0.19   
Union density t-1   0.40* 
Number of countries/observations  71/394  56/251 
R
2 within  0.23  0.31 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects.  
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Table 6 presents the results when we interact our structural variables with terms of 
trade volatility in regressions whose dependent variable is inflation volatility. Once 
again, we find that adopting a flexible exchange rate helps to moderate the effect of 
terms of trade volatility. The estimates imply that given a one standard deviation 
increase in the volatility of terms of trade shocks, other things equal, annual 
inflation volatility will be around 0.22 percentage points lower in economies with 
floating exchange rates than fixed exchange rate regimes (see Regression [6.2]). 
Coefficients on interactions between terms of trade volatility and private credit, 
and terms of trade volatility and strict monetary policy both produced positive – 
though insignificant – coefficients.16 To further investigate the role of monetary 
policy regimes and to abstract from the multi-collinearity concerns raised above, 
Regression [6.5] excludes the credit and lagged inflation terms. While the 
coefficient on the interaction between terms of trade volatility and strict monetary 
policy remains insignificant, the strict monetary policy term by itself is negative 
and significant at the 5 per cent level. This suggests that monetary policy regimes 
that have become relatively more strict on inflation have played a role in reducing 
the volatility of inflation, as well as output. 
Overall then, we interpret these results as suggesting that adopting a floating 
exchange rate regime reduces the influence of terms of trade volatility on 
macroeconomic volatility. While the results for the other institutional variables are 
less robust, and depend somewhat on the specification, the point estimates suggest 
a more obvious role in moderating output volatility, rather than inflation. To obtain 
a better understanding of how these output effects operate, we adopt a 
disaggregated approach, and estimate how terms of trade shocks and economic 
institutions affect the volatility of the various expenditure components of GDP.  
                                           
16 We also estimated models containing the various measures of labour market flexibility from 
Table 5, though none of these variables turned out to be significant explanators of inflation 
volatility.   19
Table 6: Panel Regression Results – Inflation Volatility 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
  Regression 
 [3.4]    [6.1]  [6.2]     [6.3]    [6.4]    [6.5] 
Terms of trade variables         
 Terms of trade t  0.21*** 0.20 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.23 0.23***
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1   0.01     0.01   
 Terms of trade t * Floating 
exchange rate t-1 






 Terms of trade t * Strict 
monetary policy t-1 






Control variables        
Openness t-1  –0.21 –0.21 –0.26 –0.22 –0.27 –0.29 
Credit t-1  –0.07 –0.08 –0.04 –0.07 –0.06   
Floating exchange rate t-1  –0.14 –0.14  0.24 –0.14  0.25  0.21 
Strict monetary policy t-1  –0.11 –0.11 –0.16 –0.17 –0.24 –0.48** 
Inflation t-1 0.24**  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24**  0.25**   
Currency crisis t 1.47*** 1.47*** 1.51*** 1.47*** 1.52***  1.61***
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients 











H0: institutional coefficients 











H0: institution interaction 
coefficients (jointly) = 0 




Number of countries/observations  71/402 71/402 71/402 71/402 71/402 71/402 
R
2  within  0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.48 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects.    20
5.  The Transmission of Terms of Trade Shocks 
5.1  Terms of Trade Shocks and Expenditure Volatility 
In this section we extend our analysis to consider how structural features of the 
economy affect the transmission of terms of trade shocks to the different 
components of expenditure. We start by estimating Equation (2) with no 
interaction terms, using various expenditure components of output as the 
dependent variables. Table 7 shows the result of this exercise.  
Table 7: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
 Regression 































Terms of trade variables          
 Terms of trade t  0.22*** 0.02  0.15* 0.16***  0.21***  0.14***
Control variables           
Openness t-1 0.45***  0.01  0.19  –0.05  0.20*  –0.02 
Credit t-1  0.05  0.16* –0.15 0.16**  0.01 0.05 
Floating exchange rate t-1 0.05  0.08  0.15 –0.03  0.17**  0.05 
















2  within  0.24  0.10  0.22 0.22  0.18 0.25 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively, 
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects. 
 
Focusing first on the domestic components, we find that an increase in the 
volatility of terms of trade shocks has a statistically significant positive effect on 
the volatility of (private and public) consumption, as well as the volatility of 
overall gross national expenditure (GNE).    21
While terms of trade movements are commonly thought to have a noticeable effect 
on investment, we find a small positive but statistically insignificant effect. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that the impact of terms of trade shocks on 
investment will depend upon the expected persistence of those shocks (Kent and 
Cashin 2003). Longer-lasting shocks, which affect expected returns to domestic 
production, are more likely to alter investment intentions; a purely temporary 
shock will affect current domestic income, but not future returns to domestic 
production. Since our sample contains a mixture of permanent and temporary 
shocks, it is quite plausible that, in aggregate, the volatility of these shocks will 
have little impact on investment volatility. The small impact of terms of trade 
volatility on investment volatility could also reflect the fact that our measure of 
gross fixed capital investment also includes dwelling and government investment, 
which are possibly less sensitive to terms of trade shocks.  
Table 7 also suggests that terms of trade volatility has a positive and significant 
impact on the volatility of imports and exports. This is as expected since volatility 
in the relative prices of exports and imports is likely to reflect changes in global 
demand and supply, and influence domestic production. Among the control 
variables, the results also suggest that strict monetary policy reduces the volatility 
of most categories of domestic spending and exports. In particular, the negative 
relationship between strict monetary policy and consumption volatility could imply 
that better-anchored inflation expectations promote inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing or that strict monetary policy stabilises consumption to the extent that it 
results in less volatile nominal incomes. This term could also be picking up the 
impact of lower nominal interest rates, which are likely to have eased borrowing 
constraints on households (Kent, Ossolinski and Willard 2007) – at least in the 
second half of the sample (which concludes in 2005, before the onset of the Global 
Financial Crisis).  
5.2  Stabilising Expenditure Volatility 
Table 8 shows the results when we interact our institutional variables with terms of 
trade volatility in regressions including the various expenditure components of 
GDP.  As in the output volatility regressions above, we find that the coefficient on 
the terms of trade term (by itself) remains positive (and significant) in most of 
these regressions.    22
Table 8: Panel Regression Results – Volatility of Output Components 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
(continued next page) 
Dependent variable: Consumption       
 Terms of trade t  0.61*** 0.24*** 0.23***  0.60***
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.11**     –0.10* 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1   –0.09    –0.07 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1     –0.14  0.02 
Wald tests (p-values)       
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.07  0.41  0.00  0.00 
Dependent variable: Gross fixed capital formation 
 Terms of trade t  0.13  0.05 0.04 0.07 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.03     –0.00 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1   –0.13    –0.12 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1     –0.17  –0.15 
Wald tests (p-values)       
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.80  0.28  0.28  0.17 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.11  0.15  0.08  0.05 
Dependent variable: Government consumption expenditure 
 Terms of trade t  0.32  0.17** 0.17** 0.27 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.05     –0.02 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1   –0.09    –0.08 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1     –0.18*  –0.15 
Wald tests (p-values)       
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.07  0.06  0.03  0.09 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.65  0.12  0.11  0.18 
Dependent variable: Gross national expenditure 
 Terms of trade t  0.41** 0.17*** 0.18**  0.37** 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.07     –0.05 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1   –0.05    –0.03 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1     –0.17  –0.11 
Wald tests (p-values)       
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.05  0.77  0.02  0.02 
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Table 8: Panel Regression Results – Volatility of Output Components 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
(continued) 
Dependent variable: Exports       
 Terms of trade t  0.28 0.20*** 0.22***  0.26 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.02     –0.01 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1   0.03    0.04 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1     –0.07  –0.07 
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.91  0.09  0.08  0.26 
Dependent variable: Imports       
 Terms of trade t  0.11 0.16*** 0.16***  0.02 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  0.01    0.05 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1   –0.09    –0.08 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1     –0.21**  –0.24** 
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.47  0.18  0.01  0.02 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. Control variables not shown for sake of brevity. All regressions include
country- and time-fixed effects 
 
Our results suggest that financial market development reduces the impact of terms 
of trade volatility on consumption volatility, and that this effect is statistically 
significant. The obvious interpretation of this result is that greater access to 
financial markets allows households to smooth their consumption in response to 
income volatility resulting from terms of trade shocks. When households are 
unable to save or borrow to smooth income fluctuations, consumption growth is 
more volatile. This is an interesting finding because previous studies (such as   
Beck et al 2006) have tended to downplay the extent to which financial market 
development stabilises output volatility in the presence of terms of trade shocks. It 
is also possible that the financial market development term – proxied by the ratio 
of credit to GDP – is also capturing the effects of access to business credit, or more 
generally, a broader set of economic reforms.    24
Among the other components of domestic spending, the coefficients on the strict 
monetary policy and flexible exchange rate interaction variables are usually 
negative, but rarely statistically significant. One exception is the strict monetary 
policy interaction term in the government consumption volatility regression, which 
is significant. Also, the strict monetary policy interaction term is almost significant 
at the 10 per cent level in the GNE and investment regressions, while the floating 
exchange rate interaction term is marginally significant in the investment volatility 
equation (with a p-value of 0.13). Overall, these results provide weak evidence that 
adopting a monetary policy regime that is strict on inflation and a flexible 
exchange rate regime can help to stabilise the domestic components of demand in 
the face of terms of trade shocks.  
Turning to the external variables, our results suggest that strict monetary policy 
helps to reduce the volatility of imports growth in the presence of terms of trade 
shocks. The same is true of a floating exchange rate regime, though this result is on 
the margin of being significant (with a p-value of 0.14). Given that demand for 
imports is likely to be closely tied to domestic demand, this result provides 
evidence for our suggestion that these institutions help to mitigate the effect of 
terms of trade shocks on domestic economic conditions. None of the institutional 
variables has a statistically significant impact on the volatility of export growth in 
the presence of terms of trade shocks, although a floating exchange rate in 
particular is likely to stabilise income flows in response to terms of trade shocks.  
6.  Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our results, we considered a number of alternative 
specifications of our terms of trade and control variables, none of which 
substantively affects our conclusions.17 Our key findings are also robust to the 
exclusion of various groups of countries (to control for endogeneity bias), 
                                           
17 These included: adding the average level of inflation over the previous five-year block to the 
output volatility regressions to control for monetary shocks, including exchange rate volatility 
(measured in SDR or nominal effective exchange rate terms) as an additional variable and 
multiplying terms of trade volatility by an economy’s trade share to control for the possibility 
that terms of trade volatility has a larger effect on more open economies. Results of these 
robustness tests are available from the authors on request.   25
alternative sample periods, and the inclusion of additional variables to control for 
other types of shocks. 
While assuming that terms of trade shocks are exogenous is probably reasonable 
for small economies, it is not strictly true for very large countries or for countries 
that exert substantial pricing power in the markets for certain commodities. To 
explore this issue, we re-estimated our model excluding two groups of countries – 
the G7 economies and non-commodity producers – whose terms of trade have 
some chance of being influenced by domestic economic developments.18 The 
motivation for the latter test is that, because commodities tend to be homogeneous 
goods, terms of trade shocks for most of these countries are likely to be exogenous 
with respect to domestic economic conditions.19 
The results of these exercises, shown in Tables C2 and C3, are similar to our 
baseline regressions. Indeed, the only noticeable difference is that the coefficient 
on terms of trade volatility is often slightly larger, suggesting that terms of trade 
shocks are more disruptive for smaller economies and for commodity exporters. 
While excluding OPEC oil producers from our sample also produced qualitatively 
similar results, the floating exchange rate interaction term became significant at the 
13 per cent level.20 However, to the extent that Australia’s terms of trade is 
reasonably correlated with that of oil exporters (reflecting Australia’s status as a 
major exporter of coal and iron ore), we are inclined to retain this OPEC variation 
in our central specification.  
Although the inclusion of time-fixed effects controlled for the existence of 
common shocks, it is still interesting to examine the extent to which the large 
amount of macroeconomic and terms of trade volatility that many economies 
experienced in the 1970s affects our sample. To do this, we re-estimate our 
equations over the period 1980–2005, which was a time of comparative 
                                           
18 The economic significance of some of the G7 economies has declined in recent years relative 
to some of the larger developing economies, including China, India and Brazil. However, as 
our sample includes the period 1971–2005, the G7 probably reflects the most economically 
significant economies over this sample. 
19 We classified commodity producers as those countries for whom manufactured goods account 
for less than 50 per cent of export revenue. 
20 However, this change in significance mainly reflects a larger standard error – associated with 
the smaller sample size – as opposed to a meaningful reduction in the point estimate.   26
macroeconomic stability for many economies in our sample.21 As Table C4 shows, 
the interaction term on strict monetary policy becomes highly significant in the 
output volatility regressions, while our finding that floating exchange rate regimes 
cushion the impact of terms of trade shocks remains intact. The results from the 
post-1980 period suggest that the results based on the longer sample understate the 
role of strict monetary policy in helping to moderate the effects of terms of trade 
shocks.  
Finally, despite our focus on the terms of trade shocks, there are likely to be other 
external factors that influence macroeconomic volatility (see Lui 2008, for 
example). While the time-fixed effects in our regressions will control for shocks 
that are common across countries (such as to productivity or technology), it is 
possible that our terms of trade variable is at least partly proxying for other 
external influences that directly affect domestic output volatility through trade 
and/or confidence channels. To control for this possibility, we included a measure 
of trading partner output volatility in our regressions. We construct this variable by 
aggregating the output volatility of each country’s ten largest trading partners, 
using bilateral export weights at five-year intervals (for instance, output volatility 
for the period 1981–1985 is weighted by the 1980 export share; see Appendix A 
for more details). While we weight this variable on the basis of the top ten trading 
partners to ease the computational burden of this exercise, it provides a reasonably 
comprehensive coverage.22  
Table C5 shows the results from the post-1980 regression controlling for trading 
partner output volatility (tpvol).23 Most of the key results from Table C4 remain 
intact. While the terms of trade coefficient is positive but less consistently 
significant, the floating exchange rate and strict monetary policy interaction terms 
remain negative and are significant (by themselves) at the 5 per cent level. 
Interestingly, tpvol enters the model with a negative sign, although this term is 
generally insignificant. Further analysis revealed that while tpvol was statistically 
significant and positively related to output volatility in a simple regression with 
                                           
21 Of course, even this period was not free of macroeconomic volatility in particular regions, 
most notably the ‘Peso Crisis’ in Latin America in the early 1990s, and the ‘Asian Financial 
Crisis’ of the late 1990s.  
22  For instance, we are able to capture at least to two-thirds to three-quarters of the value of 
exports for most countries in our sample. 
23 Comprehensive bilateral export weights are only available from 1980.   27
country-fixed effects, it became insignificant (and in some cases negative) once 
time-fixed effects were included. We also re-estimated our models with tpvol 
instead of time-fixed effects to control for global shocks, but the explanatory 
power of these models were somewhat lower. The results suggest that, to the extent 
that tpvol captures external influences relevant to macroeconomic volatility, these 
tend to be common across countries.  
7.  Conclusion 
This paper explores the effect of terms of trade shocks on macroeconomic 
volatility using a panel of 71 countries from 1971–2005. We find that the volatility 
of terms of trade shocks has a statistically significant and positive impact on the 
volatility of output growth and inflation. We also explore how different policy 
frameworks and the structure of markets influence the transmission of terms of 
trade shocks. While there is evidence that monetary policy frameworks that focus 
on low inflation tend to reduce macroeconomic volatility in general, floating 
exchange rates seem to be the key to lower macroeconomic volatility for 
economies that are subject to sizeable terms of trade shocks.  
We also examined how the volatility of terms of trade shocks affects the volatility 
of the main expenditure components of GDP. Our results suggest that terms of 
trade volatility primarily affects the volatility of the growth of household 
consumption, exports and imports. Perhaps surprisingly, investment volatility 
appears less affected by terms of trade shocks, although this could reflect the 
influence of the persistence of terms of trade shocks, or the inclusion of 
government and dwelling investment – dealing with these would be an interesting 
avenue for further research. Financial market development appears to dampen the 
effect of terms of trade shocks on the volatility of consumption growth. Monetary 
policy that focuses on low inflation and a flexible exchange rate regime help to 
stabilise imports in response to terms of trade volatility. 
These results are broadly robust to alternative specifications, including the 
omission of large economies and non-commodity producers. When we re-
estimated our models over a shorter sample from 1980 – a period of relative 
macroeconomic stability – we find a role for monetary policy, as well as flexible   28
exchange rates, in reducing the volatility of output in the presence of large terms of 
trade shocks. 
Overall, our results suggest that even though global movements in relative prices 
are beyond the control of policy-makers in small economies, policy-makers can 
still influence how those movements affect the economy.   29
Appendix A:  Data Descriptions and Sources 
Real GDP per capita and its expenditure components in constant 2000 US dollars 
(World Bank, World Development Indicators). 
Inflation: Year-ended percentage change in the consumer price index (World 
Development Indicators). 
Terms of trade: Export price index divided by import price index. Where 
possible, these data have been sourced from the World Development Indicators. 
Where these data are unavailable, we have spliced data from the Penn World 
Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). Data for 2006–2008 for industrialised 
economies (including Australia) are sourced from the OECD. Data for 2009 are 
forecasts, sourced from the OECD Economic Outlook No 85. 
Private credit: Ratio of domestic credit claims on the private sector to GDP 
(World Development Indicators). 
Exchange rate flexibility: Dummy variable taking a value of one if an economy’s 
exchange rate regime is classified as either floating or managed floating according 
to  Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and zero otherwise. 
Strict monetary policy regime: Dummy variable indicating if an economy has a 
formal inflation targeting regime or if it behaved as if it had a formal inflation 
target. Formal inflation targeters are sourced from IMF (2006). In addition, 
Germany, Japan and Switzerland are assigned a value of one throughout the 
sample, while the United States is assigned a value of one from 1981. All 
economies that are part of the euro area are assumed to have a strict monetary 
policy. 
Openness: The sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by gross 
domestic product. All data are in current price local currency terms (World 
Development Indicators).   30
Labour market flexibility: The index of labour market regulations component of 
the Economic Freedom of the World Index published by the Fraser Institute. The 
index assigns economies a labour market flexibility index rating between one (least 
flexible) and ten (most flexible). The index is based on an economy’s mandated 
minimum wage as a proportion of average value added per worker, the extent of 
regulations impeding the hiring and firing of workers, the extent of centralised 
wage bargaining, the mandated cost of hiring workers (including social security 
and payroll taxes), the mandated cost of worker dismissal, and the use and duration 
of conscription (Gwartney and Lawson 2008). 
Union density: The log of the ratio of trade union members to the total workforce 
(Rama and Artecona 2002). 
Trading partner output volatility: The log of the output volatility of each 
country’s ten largest trading partners, aggregated using bilateral nominal export 
shares sourced from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.  A country’s top ten 
trading partners is initially determined on the basis of average bilateral trade flows 
between 1980 to 2005. The export shares of each country’s top ten trading partners 
are normalised to one in order to construct export weights, and these export 
weights are allowed to vary at five-year intervals.    31
Appendix B:  List of Countries 
Table B1: List of Countries 
Algeria
c












































  New Zealand  United Kingdom 
Brazil
c
 Hong  Kong  Niger
c
 United  States 
Cameroon
c








































 Italy  Portugal   
Dominican Republic
c














 Spain   
El Salvador
c
  Korea, Republic of  Sweden   
Finland Madagascar
c
 Switzerland  
Note:   c = commodity producer 
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Appendix C:  Additional Results 
Table C1: Correlations –
 SD   












SD real GDP shocks  0.39       
SD consumption shocks  0.44  0.63     
SD investment shocks  0.36  0.62  0.57   
SD government consumption shocks  0.53  0.47  0.56  0.52 
SD exports shocks  0.47  0.46  0.44  0.40 
SD imports shocks  0.53  0.59  0.64  0.62 
SD inflation shocks  0.50  0.49  0.45  0.48 
Credit (share of GDP)  –0.43  –0.27  –0.39  –0.37 
Floating exchange rate  0.01  –0.02  –0.11  –0.07 
Strict monetary policy  –0.29  –0.30  –0.42  –0.35 
Openness (share of GDP)  –0.33  –0.01  0.07  0.04 
Notes:  Correlations based on a sample of 71 countries and 411 observations. All variables specified in  
Sources:   see Appendix A 
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0.52          
0.52  0.51         
0.50  0.42  0.50       
–0.49 –0.36  –0.38  –0.48       
–0.08 –0.05  –0.06  –0.05  0.17     
–0.34 –0.28  –0.37  –0.36  0.60  0.29   
–0.03 –0.07  –0.15  –0.28  0.25  –0.13  –0.04 
logarithmic form except for the floating exchange rate and strict monetary policy dummies. 
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Table C2: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility Excluding G7 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
Terms of trade variables        
 Terms of trade t  0.44** 0.17*** 0.15** 0.44** 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.09     –0.08 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1  –0.15*    –0.13* 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1    –0.15  –0.07 
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.02 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.27  0.01  0.07  0.01 
H0: institution interaction coefficients 
(jointly) = 0 
      
0.05 
Number of countries/observations 64/348  64/348  64/348  64/348 
R
2 within 0.22  0.22  0.21  0.23 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. Control variables not shown for sake of brevity. All regressions include 
country- and time-fixed effects. 
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Table C3: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility Excluding  
Non-commodity Exporters 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1975, the last in 2005
Terms of trade variables        
 Terms of trade t  0.46* 0.18**  0.14*  0.45* 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1  –0.10     –0.08 
 Terms of trade t * Floating exchange rate t-1  –0.16*    –0.14* 
 Terms of trade t * Strict monetary policy t-1    –0.15  –0.07 
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.06  0.04  0.15  0.07 
H0: institutional coefficients (jointly) = 0  0.46  0.07  0.20  0.05 
H0: institution interaction coefficients 
(jointly) = 0 
      
0.19 
Number of countries/observations 48/260  48/260  48/260  48/260 
R
2 within 0.19  0.19  0.19  0.20 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. Control variables not shown for sake of brevity. All regressions include 
country- and time-fixed effects. 
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Table C4: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility Estimation  
Beginning in 1981 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1985, the last in 2005
Terms of trade variables         
 Terms of trade t  0.12* 0.38* 0.18**  0.16**  0.31 
 Terms of trade t * Credit t-1   –0.07     –0.03 
 Terms of trade t * Floating  
exchange rate t-1 




 Terms of trade t * Strict  
monetary policy t-1 




Control variables       
Openness t-1 0.05  0.07  –0.01  0.08  0.03 
Credit t-1 0.21*  0.35**  0.27**  0.21*  0.33* 
Floating exchange rate t-1 0.21**  0.23*** 0.58*** 0.22**  0.55***
Strict monetary policy t-1  –0.26** –0.31** –0.28** –0.08  –0.18 
Wald tests (p-values)       
H0: terms of trade coefficients  









H0: institutional coefficients  









H0: institution interaction coefficients 
(jointly) = 0 
     
0.02 
Number of countries/observations  71/273 71/273 71/273 71/273 71/273 
R
2  within  0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 
Notes:   ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects. 
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Table C5: Panel Regression Results – Output Volatility Controlling for 
Trading Partner Volatility 
Fixed-effects estimation, five-year blocks, the first ending in 1985, the last in 2005
Terms of trade variables        
σ Terms of trade t 0.10  0.33  0.17*  0.14*  0.23 
σ Terms of trade t * Credit t-1   –0.06      –0.01 
σ Terms of trade t * Floating  
exchange rate t-1 




σ Terms of trade t * Strict  
monetary policy t-1 




Control variables        
Openness t-1 –0.02  0.01  –0.06  0.02  –0.02 
Credit t-1 0.20  0.32  0.28**  0.21  0.30 
Floating exchange rate t-1 0.24**  0.26*** 0.64***  0.25***  0.61*** 
Strict monetary policy t-1 –0.30**  –0.34**  –0.34**  –0.14  –0.22 
Trading partner output volatility t-1 –0.16 –0.17*  –0.15  –0.15 –0.15 
Wald tests (p-values)        
H0: terms of trade coefficients  









H0: institutional coefficients  









H0: institution interaction coefficients 
(jointly) = 0 
      
0.05 
Number of countries/observations 64/246  64/246  64/246  64/246  64/246 
R
2 within  0.20  0.20  0.22  0.20  0.22 
Notes:  ***, **, and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively,
using robust standard errors. All regressions include country- and time-fixed effects. 38 
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